Samurai Rx for Libya

After WW2 (1945) the Allies occupied Germany till 1949, when both the Federal Republic (West Germany) and the Democratic Republic (East Germany) were set up as a result of the breakdown of cooperation between the NATO powers and the Soviet Union (Stalin). The Allied occupiers oversaw the running of Germany (in four major sectors: British, French, Russian, US), and the de-nazification programs, and war crimes trials. Allied troops remained in West Germany until 1955, their numbers being reduced over time, and after that mainly US troops remained in US (a.k.a. NATO) bases (till today).

The US (Allied) occupation of Japan after WW2 lasted from 1945 to 1952. The U.S. governance of occupied Japan transformed the entire form of government (to a parliamentary democracy), and in conjunction with other Allies (British, Indian, French, Australian, Nationalist Chinese, Philippine) war crimes tribunals (of Japanese militarists) were held in Manila. The U.S. kept bases in Japan (to this day), and as the Korean War had started in 1950, the U.S. pumped huge amounts of money into Japan as its platform from which to launch attacks on the Korean peninsula, which US spending kick-started the rapid growth of the Japanese economy.

Germany (West, until 1990 when it reunified with East) and Japan were thus tied economically and militarily to the US-led world capitalist system (the “First World”). There was never a post 1945 Nazi insurgency, nor a post 1945 Imperialist Japanese insurgency, nor a spawning of such international “terrorist” groups.

The NATO (“Allied”) occupation of Libya lasted only 11 days, occurring between Gaddafi’s death on 20 October 2011, and 31 October 2011. During the Libyan Civil War, the Gaddafi regime relied mainly on mercenary troops (largely Sahelian Africans, but also Western mercenaries and technicians), and Gaddafi was bent on mass murder of the pro-democracy Arab Spring inspired activists who opposed his regime, which opposition was favored by most of the Libyan population. [This paragraph has been revised, as prompted by Robert Pearsall in a comment, below.]

The new Libyan government had asked the NATO-UN forces to stay till the end of 2011 (two months), to help it stabilize the country. But, the NATO powers did not wish to invest the time, money and troops/people-power (with the possibilities of some casualties) for that purpose. The broken Libya of today, with mass trafficking of African refugees (by today’s “Barbary Pirates”) towards Mediterranean Europe; and Islamist militia-terrorist bases and training camps, is the result.

What the NATO powers did regarding Libya is equivalent to an unwise patient with an infection who stops taking his full course of prescribed antibiotics after three days, when he’s feeling “good,” instead of the full week or two, and the infection is not eradicated but comes back and is worse because it has mutated to become resistant to the original antibiotics it was suppressed with.

The idea of R2P, “responsibility to protect,” is correct; those with the power (military might) to prevent a dictator from enacting a mass atrocity crime should do so as an act of solidarity with all of humanity, otherwise they share in the guilt of the atrocity as a sin of omission. But, in committing to such action one should do it right, completely, not on the cheap. The goal is not simply the downfall of a dictator and mass murderer, but the transformation of and unity with a whole population. Selfishness is not a good long-term defense. As “Kambei Shimada” said in Kurosawa’s “Seven Samurai”: “This is the nature of war: by protecting others, you save yourself.”

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No Regrets On Libya

Non-interventionists who regret the outcome of the Libyan Civil War continue to seek some type of moral consolation for their support of Muammar Gaddafi’s dictatorship by trying to shame the supporters of the UN-NATO intervention (on the side of the Libyan rebels) by posting editorials of complaint about the Libyan Civil War’s aftermath of political unruliness and frequent lawlessness.

My article is a response to those regrets and complaints. This article is not intended to convince anyone to change their opinion on the Libyan Civil War, since that is impossible. It merely states what I think. The article was written on October 14, and submitted for publication the same day.

No Regrets On Libya
4 November 2013
http://www.swans.com/library/art19/mgarci74.html

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Chemical Defanging of the Syrian Civil War Begins

Interestingly now in the Middle East, Russia is playing a protective role with regard to its client, the al-Assad regime in Syria, in a mirror-image of the US protection of Zionist-Likud Israel, from the threat of UN Security Council resolutions and international interventions. Will China soon follow the US and now Russian examples and express its power by finding a wayward foreign pet to protect from world opprobrium? Will the Obama Administration or any of its successors follow the example of that apt student of American foreign policy, Vladimir Putin, and lead its Israeli client to nuclear and chemical and biological weapons disarmament under the protective cover of American military might and UN Security Council veto power?

It is so easy to imagine a more wonderful world.

There are many questions about U.S., Russian, Iranian, Israeli, Arab League, European, and world (UN General Assembly) competitive interests in Syria, and preferences regarding the outcome of the Syrian Civil War. I kept my focus narrow (chemical disarmament) in my article because I am not able to give a “complete theory” about all the international complications related to the Syrian Civil War (the “greater” game if you will).

I do believe the fear about chemical weapons spreading is real and widespread, which is why “antagonists” like the U.S. and Russia can so readily agree (3 days!) on a process to quickly remove them from Syria (at least the government stockpile, at first).

Though limited in scope, the mere fact of such new cooperation — instead of a U.S.-led air war in Syria — is clearly a positive development. This positive development gives a little bit of encouragement to the hopeful fantasy that maybe the U.S., Russia, and Iran (the new Iranian government and Obama have exchanged letters, Obama disclosed on TV), and others, might move beyond just cooperating on Syrian chemical disarmament, to negotiating rather than shooting out their differences on Syria, and the region.

My purpose in writing about the Syrian Civil War is to help make this last suggestion explicit (chemical disarmament as the nucleus of wider political settlements). I realize my opinion does not go very far, but even so I have the opportunity, and the effort seems worthwhile. Since it is very rare for people (especially “important” ones) to acknowledge the sources of “their” ideas, we really can never know if some of our suggestions in our little corner of the blogosphere have had useful impact or not. But, unless they are available publicly, there is no chance. So we send them off, like messages in bottles cast out to sea. Who knows? Even if we never see it, maybe somebody will get rescued as a result.

Chemical Defanging of the Syrian Civil War Begins
22 September 2013
http://www.swans.com/library/art19/mgarci71.html

These developments were anticipated by suggestions made 4 months ago in an article linked from here:
https://manuelgarciajr.com/2013/05/15/sarin-in-syria/

Sarin In Syria

This article describes sarin, a nerve toxin chemical weapon, and the many ways its presence in the arsenal of the Syrian Arab Republic is affecting the international politics related to the Syrian Civil War. This article was completed in the early hours of May 6, 2013.

Sarin In Syria
14 May 2013
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/05/14/sarin-in-syria/

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Non-intervention Versus R2P

In Jean Bricmont’s Counterpunch article of December 4th:

Beware the Anti-Anti-War Left
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/12/04/beware-the-anti-anti-war-left/

he makes a clear and impassioned case for his conviction that armed interventions by Western powers and NATO, justified by the principle of “responsibility to protect” (R2P, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect), should be uniformly opposed by leftists (and preferably everybody).

Bricmont argues that all such military interventions ultimately advance the geo-political aims of the United States, because it is the leading power in both the United Nations and NATO. In this view, “humanitarian interventions” are always excuses for advancements of US-led Western imperialism, by military force.

To uniformly oppose such military interventions is to believe that preventing the advance of US (primarily) geo-political aims by military means is always preferable to preventing the course of events from playing out in states undergoing violent social and political turmoil. The only forms of intervention acceptable to this strict non-interference point of view would be diplomacy according to international law, and real humanitarian assistance by non-governmental agencies, as possible. Bricmont writes:

“We should demand of our governments the strict respect for international law, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and cooperation instead of confrontation. Non-interference means not only military non-intervention. It applies also to diplomatic and economic actions: no unilateral sanctions, no threats during negotiations, and equal treatment of all States.”

The other point of view on this question is the belief that in certain cases it is preferable to prevent the likely course of events from playing out, even if it means that the Western powers and NATO (led by the United States) may also gain some geo-political advantages as a result of the military intervention. This point of view would have to believe that the blood to be shed during the prosecution of a military intervention would likely be of lesser magnitude than would be the case without the intervention, and that those killed or injured by interventionists would predominantly be combatants or perpetrators of war crimes, rather than innocent civilians.

Everything depends on vague judgments in the interventionist view: “in certain cases,” which ones?; “geo-political advantages,” exactly what?; bloodshed of “likely lesser magnitude,” how to estimate?, and how to know what might have been if unhindered? There are no such uncertainties in the non-interventionist view.

A great deal of emotion is expended by the opponents in the intervention versus non-intervention debate, and historical examples are dissected, interpreted, re-interpreted and tossed back and forth, for example:

— German, Italian, Soviet and anti-fascist volunteer interventions in Spain 1936-1939,

— Western non-intervention in Hungary 1956,

— India’s intervention in the Bangladesh Liberation War 1971,

— Vietnam invades Cambodia in 1978 and removes the Khmer Rouge from power,

— Cuban interventions in Angola 1975-1991,

— non-intervention (“failed intervention”) in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994,

— British intervention in 2000 to save the UN intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War,

— France’s intervention in the Côte d’Ivoire since 2002,

— the UN and NATO interventions in the Yugoslav Wars 1991-1999, and

— Libya 2011.

I find it interesting that Bricmont sees most leftists in Europe as being interventionist, I find just the opposite here in the United States. Certainly, among people who otherwise identify as leftists there exists a divide on the question of non-intervention a.k.a. responsibility to protect. I am not going to argue the question one way or the other here.

Obviously, it is a matter of judgment between accepting either a militarily gained geo-political advance for the interventionists (maybe) or the likely commission of a mass atrocity crime. As people are different, they will weigh the specifics and potentialities of any situation differently, so they will arrive at differing judgments.

The fact of this difference of opinion within the leftist political orientation led me to question what the definition of a leftist was, and from that I wondered how any political orientation could be accurately classified, since all the labels commonly used (e.g., “conservative,” “liberal,” “socialist,” “progressive”) often seem vague or inaccurate. As a result, I invented a system for classifying political orientations, and this helped me to understand political differences such as the (very uneven) interventionist versus non-interventionist split among leftists, along with other cloudy political formations. My article on that is:

Left Conservatives Under Right Progressives
3 December 2012
http://www.swans.com/library/art18/mgarci58.html

While I happen to agree with the application of the R2P principle in some cases (like Libya), my article aims to identify the general types of political orientations, not to advocate for any one in particular. In the language of my article, I see Bricmont as a democratic socialist conservative ideologue, while my own preference is democratic socialist progressive pragmatism.

Bricmont’s non-interventionist conviction is very deep, and it reflects his judgments and values. His very clear and extensive presentation of this conviction, in Counterpunch, helps those who share it to articulate their own agreement to it within their social circles, and it challenges those of different view to be clear about why they see the matter differently.

Like Bricmont, I am clear about my convictions, in my case in favor of R2P, and I did my best to present my view in articles on Libya that were rather difficult to get published in leftist Internet journals in 2011 (that story in http://www.swans.com/library/art17/mgarci31.html).

I find that arguments between people of opposing convictions are pointless, but that identifying the sources of those conflicting convictions can be quite enlightening.