Appreciating F. Scott Fitzgerald

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Appreciating F. Scott Fitzgerald

After decades of resisting the writings of F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896-1940), thinking him and them as inconsequential and passé, I finally fell under their spell. He was a literary genius, a great romantic and perceptive and fundamentally tragic writer. His novel, The Great Gatsby, is shimmering, transcendental (beyond the powers of cinema to capture), and – from the perspective of our limited human lifetimes – eternal.

A collection of his short stories compiled in 1960, Babylon Revisited, is fascinating, showing how inventive he was at devising characters and plots detailing the intertwining of the psychologies of those characters. And he would present it all with fluidly lyrical prose of amazing compactness. What has drawn me to his stories is his implicitly deep understanding of the human heart, which he conveys from behind the casual facade of both manic and faded Jazz Age settings.

What I see from his own personal story is that every true artist must constantly struggle to be able to do the work that expresses their art and gives their life meaning, despite the enervating drag of the many demands heaped on one by the needs of economic survival, exhibiting sufficient conformity for social acceptance, and the emotional needs – and illusions – of close family. I think that is the great heroic epic of each artist’s personal life: somehow producing the work held deep in the heart and soul and mind, despite both the intentional and indifferent impediments placed before that artistic drive by life’s banalities. Some succeed better than others, and some are broken and fail in that they themselves are lost to life and their unknown art stillborn.

With all that F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, I think that we are only seeing fragments of his potential, even given that he was one of America’s supreme literary artists. I appreciate his decades of struggle to produce those gems. It can be very hard to be an ordinary, imperfect human being gifted to be an instinctive channel to a primordial artistic insight and creative drive. His gift to us is the wider awareness we may gain by reading his stories, and immersing ourselves in his enthralling lyricism. I’ve now (16 March 2019) embarked on Tender Is The Night, which he called “a confession of faith.”

In the last year of his life, F. Scott Fitzgerald earned $13.13 in royalties ($238.44 in 2019 dollars) Since his death in 1940, more than 10 million copies of his books have been sold throughout the world (up to 2001).

An excellent documentary on F. Scott Fitzgerald was produced by PBS and shown in 2001; it includes interviews with people who knew him personally. The documentary on Fitzgerald produced by the BBC and shown in 2013 is an interesting and sympathetic literary criticism.

Winter Dreams: F Scott Fitzgerald’s Life Remembered (PBS, 2001)

https://youtu.be/XnEO8yT_ApM

Sincerely, F. Scott Fitzgerald (BBC, 2013)
https://youtu.be/cCfUsaX5F10

Standing back, looking at the U.S.A. today [16 March 2019], and reading Fitzgerald, one can’t help but remember the old talking point, Fitz or Hem? [Fitzgerald or Hemingway?] Some of us preferred the latter, the new prose style, the correct progressive politics, the lessons in manly courage. But the style has been absorbed, the politics were hardly heroic in the 1940s’ context, and the muscular courage is rather sickening just now as we get news of New Zealand, Paris and Manchester. Fitzgerald’s America, on the other hand, is still with us, money-orientated, cynical, romantic, racist and full of ambition that ends in crime.

— Peter Byrne

It has always been easy for me to see why Hemingway was popular with Americans, but for those very reasons I was not enthralled by him. I have enjoyed some of his prose, but never found a soul there that interested me. Now that I’m older, and have my own memories of being battered around in that money-oriented, cynical, racist and criminally ambitious America, I have found Fitzgerald’s tender heart and withering insights to be just right, both generally and for me. I learn slowly, but I’m glad when I do.

The above comments have already appeared at:
https://manuelgarciajr.com/2019/03/16/i-learn-about-f-scott-fitzgerald/

I finished reading Tender Is The Night, by F. Scott Fitzgerald, on 7 April 2019. I can’t remember ever being so affected by a novel. Fitzgerald’s amazing insights into human nature, human character, social interactions, and marriage, along with his breathtaking lyricism all just leave me stunned. Perhaps I lack the sophistication to know better, and be less impressed.

Also, there are quite a few parallels between Dick Diver’s (ersatz F.S.F.) story arc (as regards his Sentimental Education — see Flaubert) and my own. For me, were it not for the balm of decades having passed since my “Dick Diver” years, it would be painfully so.

I can see where some of the superficial aspects of the novel, such as the glib sophistication and the not-up-to-modern-day politically-correct standards as regards the mention of Negroes (though I found no actual lack of sympathy here) could put off the “typical” American reader today. But, for me, the power of the core insight, emotion and intelligence of the novel shines through those superficial trivialities, and leaves me in silent awe of the majestically tragic and accurate vision – the life – behind the whole work.

Fitzgerald thought this novel his best; he called The Great Gatsby a “tour de force” (it is superb, I liked it) but viewed Tender Is The Night as “a confession of faith.” Reading Tender Is The Night opened up a great insight into F.S.F., the man, for me because I could connect my inner experiences (on marriage and children, and even some on doing science) with his real and fictionalized lives. I can easily imagine being Dick Diver.

Scott was an incandescent artist, who was trapped by fate: by the emotional and financial entanglements brought on by a decent romantic and fundamentally boyish nature, by public fickleness, by societal shallowness and materialism, by marriage to madness, and by all-too-common-and-human personal weakness. Who doesn’t want to be loved?

My thoughts may not be entirely coherent here, but I am overwhelmed.

By 17 April 2019, I was deep into Love Of The Last Tycoon, A Western (F.S.F.’s final choice of title). He had a sharp eye and a wicked sense of humor. His abilities never diminished, though sadly he did. His prose is smooth and graceful while at the same time being so rich and suggestive.

After finishing this novel I’ll have to decide what to read next: This Side Of Paradise or The Beautiful And The Damned. I’ll probably end up reading both. I also have another collection of his short stories waiting to be read, Six Stories From The Jazz Age, And Other Stories. So far, Tender Is The Night is the one that hit me most forcefully in a personal way.

Your words were not lost on me. They got me thinking about Tender Is The Night that I’d read many years ago. I dug it out and launched into a rereading only finished just now [19 April 2019]. The Great Gatsby had always been my favourite among Fitzgerald’s books. I liked its perfect balance and the way it held the American dream up so we could view it from all sides, light and dark. Tender Is The Night struck me, first time around, as misshapen. I still think it suffered from being worked over for too many years. The author’s focus necessarily shifted. However, reading it again, I find the good parts more deeply felt than anything in The Great Gatsby. That was a younger man’s novel. With the years, Fitzgerald, like you and me, got deeper into himself. I think that’s why it touches us so now. I don’t believe we should impose our standards of political correctness on authors of the past. The very fact that they might be out of line for us today is a valuable lesson. I confess that one little thing does annoy me in Fitzgerald’s thinking. Here Hemingway was right. When his friend F.S.F. told him that the rich were different, i.e., beings on a higher plane, Hem replied, “Of course they’re different. They have more money”.

— Peter Byrne

I’m put off a bit by Hemingway’s treatment of Fitzgerald, the man who recommended him to Max Perkins [the editor of both] at Scribner’s [their publisher], which got Hemingway launched on his celebrated career. Besides publicly disparaging Fitzgerald when he was down (in 1936, with the publication of Fitzgerald’s three-part essay, The Crack-Up, in Esquire Magazine), he didn’t even have the courtesy to attend Fitzgerald’s lonely funeral (in very late December 1940), where only eleven people attended (according to one attendee who described the scene in the documentary Winter Dreams), mostly locals from the family that he had rented a house from in Maryland. I haven’t run across anything negative said about Hemingway by Fitzgerald, but only good things (including in The Crack-Up). I don’t think that responding to Fitzgerald with graciousness instead of pettiness would have hurt Hemingway’s John Wayne style macho man public image, it would probably have burnished it instead. But, writers and artists of all kinds are human, and humans are imperfect, and I may be asking too much of some of the icons.

One thing about Fitzgerald that I now know is that he was really a poet, a prose writer who sought to achieve the artistry of the great romantic English poets: Byron, Shelley, Keats, Wordsworth. No wonder he was ground down by the commercialism and shallowness of the make-a-quick-buck magazine trade and movie script writing he was forced to do. Just yesterday [20 April 2019], I finished Fitzgerald’s short story The Curious Case Of Benjamin Button. In it I found a line about an August night, so atmospheric, so vivid, so perfect, something the like of which I will never be able to produce, that I copied and saved it:

It was a gorgeous evening. A full moon drenched the road to the lustreless color of platinum, and late-blooming harvest flowers breathed into the motionless air aromas that were like low, half-heard laughter.

— F. Scott Fitzgerald, from The Curious Case Of Benjamin Button, section V.

It is writing like this that makes capturing a Fitzgerald story on film, beyond a mere mechanical visualization of raw plot, impossible.

I saw that the novel, which at my maturity was the strongest and supplest medium for conveying thought and emotion from one human being to another, was becoming subordinated to a mechanical and communal art that, whether in the hands of Hollywood merchants or Russian idealists, was capable of reflecting only the tritest thought, the most obvious emotion.

— F.S.F., The Crack-Up, 1936

As to Fitzgerald’s failure of political consciousness, he is pretty explicit about owning up to in the The Crack-Up, and once having done so openly it is impossible to imagine he did not have a decent political and class consciousness thereafter. He even mentions Lenin and refuses to disparage Marxists in The Crack-Up. The mid to late 1930s were years of revolutionary labor unrest and socialist advances in the United States: the West Coast longshoremen’s and general strike of 1934, the GM Fischer Body Plant sit-in strike of 1935, and the Social Security Act was signed into law that same year. The 40-year-old Fitzgerald was as different from his 20-year-old Princeton college boy self (on the make, like Gatsby), as was the bottom of the Great Depression for the down-and-outers, from the glittering carefree abandon of the leisure class of the 1920s.

I find it very impressive, admirable, that throughout his writer’s career Fitzgerald managed to produce so much inventive and lyrical work despite his personal circumstances, and that his artistry deepened as he soldiered on.

The Crack-Up
F. Scott Fitzgerald
[originally published as a three-part series in the February, March, and April 1936 issues of Esquire.]
https://www.esquire.com/lifestyle/a4310/the-crack-up/

The Moment F. Scott Fitzgerald Knew He Was a Failure
By Lili Anolik
Sep 22, 2015
https://www.esquire.com/entertainment/a38113/f-scott-fitzgerald-1015/

You’re right about Hemingway’s nastiness to Fitzgerald. He makes him appear a befuddled adolescent in A Moveable Feast, otherwise a little book of great charm. A case of the survivor writing history or anyway having the last word, I suppose.

I’ve gone through The Crack-Up and autobiographical pieces again. To my mind, Echoes of the Jazz Age, My Lost City and Early Success are fine, low-intensity essays full of welcome information. Ring, the piece on [Ring] Lardner is a marvellous bit of lit-crit of the kind that only a writer himself can offer another writer. How different from Hem on Fitz! It convinced me that Ring Lardner is the model for Abe North in Tender Is The Night. The Crack-Up proper simply recalls in a kind of diary note what the author already so powerfully represented in Tender Is The Night, Dick’s personal crisis and downhill slide.

Fitzgerald for me is a novelist of greater scope and emotional depth than Hemingway. One little thing, though, bothers me in his outlook. It’s just a germ, his idea of success. But I can’t see it as not leading to the way our esteemed president [Trump] divides humanity into “winners” and “losers”.

— Peter Byrne

I suspect that one of the causes of Fitzgerald’s great disappointment in later life (besides Zelda’s mental health) was the utter shattering of his idea of “success” as it pertained to his own career: the bitterness of a formerly naïve optimist.

Speaking of ‘success’ and its ‘disappointments’, I’ve seen many people who feel life has cheated them out of the success they felt entitled to in their younger imaginations.

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What’s Wrong With The United States?

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What’s Wrong With The United States?

In his 1995 book, The Demon-Haunted World, Science As A Candle In The Dark, Carl Sagan wrote:

I have a foreboding of an America in my children’s or grandchildren’s time — when the United States is a service and information economy; when nearly all the key manufacturing industries have slipped away to other countries; when awesome technological powers are in the hands of a very few, and no one representing the public can even grasp the issues; when the people have lost the ability to set their own agendas or knowledgeably question those in authority; when clutching our crystals and nervously consulting our horoscopes, our critical faculties in decline, unable to distinguish between what feels good and what’s true, we slide, almost without noticing, back into superstition and darkness. The dumbing down of America is most evident in the slow decay of substantive content in the enormously influential media, the 30-second sound bites (now down to 10 seconds or less), lowest common denominator programming, credulous presentations on pseudoscience and superstition, but especially a kind of celebration of ignorance. *

Isn’t this all true today? We have Ubu Roi Trump as US President and officially in control of the most awesome nuclear annihilation button on Earth. We are mostly galley slaves chained to our capitalistic economic and perceptual oars, implacably driving ourselves into the geophysical tempest of climate change. We have cracked the secrets of genetic modification and have let this incredible power be held by tight-fisted corporations only interested in their own financial gain. We have a growing infestation of measles, a disease that in 2014 was thought to be nearing extinction but which has since 2017 expanded due to a decrease in immunization, reflecting an idiotic anti-vaxxer superstition justified as a “protect-my-child” panic. Our infotainment media is a wholly-owned subsidiary of plutocracy, for the electronic diffusion of corporate propaganda against the public interest, and for the mass virtual pithing of the public mind.

What is wrong with the United States? It is the failure of its people to unite with the vision of “with charity — and justice — for all, and malice toward none,” but instead to debase themselves into passive entertainment-dependent robots, or into ambitious careerists “led by their materialism and instinctive worship of power.”

The United States Of America is both classist and tribal. These are the fault lines of American greed and politics. The varieties of American bigotry arise out of envy and resentment, from within our classes and tribes. The nation itself is big and powerful, but greatness eludes it because its people are unwilling to overcome their pettiness. Internally, the classes and tribes are fragmented by ageism and sexism, as well as by racism where a class or tribe happens to be multi-racial.

As is always true when speaking about society, all generalizations are formally wrong because one can always find individual counterexamples. However, what is wrong with the United States is that the number of such counterexamples to the sweeping criticisms made here do not count up to an overwhelming majority of the American people. If they did then everything in our society would be different, as would everybody who is now “in charge.”

The decadent nature of our society is a mirror of our cowardly denied national consensus for a pathetic tolerance of anti-intellectualism, ignorance, superstition, moral irresponsibility within our particular class and tribe, shameless sociopathic egotism, criminality labeled as capitalism, bigotry labeled as religion, and religion practiced as hate-crime.

There is no sociological fix that can come down to us, externally, from our political and judicial systems — whose only functions are to protect capitalism from popular democracy and to mediate capitalistic disputes — nor from organized religions, which arrogantly claim to hold the answers to ultimate questions (they don’t), and which demand to regulate and compel social morality.

The only possible fix is the combination of attitudes and behaviors that emerge individually out of personal commitments to principled and thoughtful living, and then merge into a mass socialist consciousness, from which collective economic, social-humanitarian, technological and self-defense actions can be logically organized.

To say that this emergent (as opposed to external) sociological fix is “utopian” is simply to dismiss the possibility of ever seeing it achieve any degree of reality, however modest. I think it better to be realistic than defeatist: our “utopia” is easily possible if we “all” want it, and though that is highly improbable it is better to align our intentions for personal conduct with this vision than to acquiesce to a personal debasement of becoming another trivial mind-numbed soul-dead unit in the official hypocrisy of decadent materialism.

Why is it better? Because you would develop and realize more of your human potential, and because you would acquire greater lived experience that would justify an authentic and satisfying sense of freedom and self-respect. Also, you would have a greater positive effect on the people you personally come in contact with, most importantly your family. I believe the abstractions we apply to the masses and label as “socialism” and “utopia” and “green new deal,” and so on, can only materialize by bleeding out of the realities of individual lives of integrity, and then mixing into a rising tide of socialist revolution.

So, what movement should you join?, politician should you vote for?, petitions should you sign?, charities should you contribute to?, job should you try to get?, sect should you fight in in our sectarian wars for political purity?, in short what is “the right way?”

How do I know? All my specific choices to these questions can be argued with — even by people who agree with me in the global abstract — because every person’s experience of life is different. Our individual templates for personal action will inevitably be ill-suited for most of each other. The persistence of people pushing their own “right way” orthodoxies onto others, whom they share a grand fuzzy vision with, is what dissipates popular energy that could otherwise propel a worthwhile — if fuzzy — collective purpose, and which instead thus leads to an enervating argumentative fragmentation of the original socialist unity.

So, at this point I am left with only platitudes and a reliance on high-minded innuendo, if tasked to spell out a detailed program to fix our society “once and for all,” to wrest it from it’s late-stage capitalist Kali Yuga.

What I believe is that the effort to do this is and will always be never-ending and myriadly multifaceted, and that any worthwhile elements of socialism that successfully make the transition from popular aspiration to realities that can be experienced, will have had to emerge atomistically from individual lives of integrity — rather than being imposed deus ex machina — in order to blend and bond organically into the humane, compassionate and intelligent future society we can so easily imagine.

All I can offer here are recommendations for aspirational solidarity, such as expressed by Albert Camus: “I rebel, therefore we exist,” and for intentional moral character, such as expressed by Thucydides as a quote by Pericles: “Honor is the only thing that does not grow old.”

Maybe from such airy notions, and a bit of personal pride, we can surprise ourselves into finally making America decent for everybody. And that would be great.

* [Thanks to Dan Kaminsky and Ivan Sudofsky for pointing me to the Carl Sagan reference and passage.]

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Mendocino County, 2019

I just came back from a visit to Mendocino County, California, and here are 20 of my pictures from that trip. I’ve chosen to present these photos at a “large” size (not “full”) and “high” resolution (not “maximum). I hope you enjoy them.

We stayed in this house, designed to collect solar heat with its high row of windows facing south, and its full length solarium. The large vegetable and fruit garden is being prepared once again for the coming spring.

 

A meditative spot by the house is the Koi Pond.

 

Daffodils have started to carpet the green fields of the old cemetery for the town of Manchester.

 

Navarro Beach, where the Navarro River meets the Pacific Ocean, south of the hamlets of Albion and Little River.

 

I can never take too many pictures of the beach and surf.

 

The “isness” of nature is so beautiful, it takes you out of yourself and into the universal and primordial.

 

Grace Carpenter Hudson (1865-1937) was an American fine arts painter. She made this self portrait in oil, in 1881, when she was a 16 year old art student in San Francisco. This photo is only of a portion of the full painting.

 

Grace Hudson spent most of her life in the small city of Ukiah (inland Mendocino County), where today many of her art works are displayed at the Grace Hudson Museum.

 

Grace Hudson focused her artistry on the portraiture of the Pomo Indians, who live (still) in the Ukiah and Potter valleys (of inland Mendocino County). She painted real people in the natural settings of the region. This particular painting is about “the birth of song.”

 

A young Pomo girl with her pet fox.

 

A young Pomo girl with an orange, and attitude.

 

Grace Hudson made many paintings of Pomo children and babies. This is a detail of one of her best known “baby pictures.”

 

Grace Hudson sketched this amazingly subtle and detailed portrait of an expert Pomo basket weaver, and friend, with bitumen (which I think of as a coal/tar crayon).

 

Nit’s Cafe is a small, wonderful Thai-themed restaurant in Fort Bragg.

 

This view shows over 90% of the dining area of Nit’s Cafe. Note the potted orchids and colored lights. The food is phenomenal; the seafood is exquisite.

 

Menus at Nit’s Cafe.

 

Here is the chef of this one-woman enterprise, Nit herself: an accomplished gourmet chef who combines refined French culinary technique with Thai sensibility, and a passion for fine cooking. A lively and lovely person. Nit’s is at 322 CA Hwy 1 (the main street through Fort Bragg, in the center of town).

 

Point Navarro, north of Navarro Beach and south of Albion and Little River; looking west toward the setting sun, from near the edge of the high cliff (rocky surf below, and a very windy day).

 

The ceaseless surf at Navarro Point.

 

Looking north from the same cliff-edge spot at Navarro Point.

 

I Learn About F. Scott Fitzgerald

Scott and Zelda Fitzgerald, with daughter Scottie

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I Learn About F. Scott Fitzgerald

After decades of resisting the writings of F. Scott Fitzgerald (1896-1940), thinking him and them as inconsequential and passé, I finally fell under their spell. He was a literary genius, a great romantic and perceptive and fundamentally tragic writer. His novel, The Great Gatsby, is shimmering, transcendental (beyond the powers of cinema to capture), and – from the perspective of our limited human lifetimes – eternal. A collection of his short stories compiled in 1960, Babylon Revisited, is fascinating, showing how inventive he was at devising characters and plots detailing the intertwining of the psychologies of those characters. And he would present it all with fluidly lyrical prose of amazing compactness. What has drawn me to his stories is his implicitly deep understanding of the human heart, which he conveys from behind the casual facade of both manic and faded Jazz Age settings. What I see from his own personal story is that every true artist must constantly struggle to be able to do the work that expresses their art and gives their life meaning, despite the enervating drag of the many demands heaped on one by the needs of economic survival, exhibiting sufficient conformity for social acceptance, and the emotional needs – and illusions – of close family. I think that is the great heroic epic of each artist’s personal life: somehow producing the work held deep in the heart and soul and mind, despite both the intentional and indifferent impediments placed before that artistic drive by life’s banalities. Some succeed better than others, and some are broken and fail in that they themselves are lost to life and their unknown art stillborn. With all that F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, I think that we are only seeing fragments of his potential, even given that he was one of America’s supreme literary artists. I appreciate his decades of struggle to produce those gems. It can be very hard to be an ordinary, imperfect human being gifted to be an instinctive channel to a primordial artistic insight and creative drive. His gift to us is the wider awareness we may gain by reading his stories, and immersing ourselves in his enthralling lyricism. I’ve now embarked on Tender Is The Night, which he called “a confession of faith.” In the last year of his life, F. Scott Fitzgerald earned $13.13 in royalties. Since his death in 1940, more than 10 million copies of his books have been sold throughout the world.

Winter Dreams: F Scott Fitzgerald’s Life Remembered (PBS, 2001)
https://youtu.be/XnEO8yT_ApM

Sincerely, F. Scott Fitzgerald (BBC, 2013)
https://youtu.be/cCfUsaX5F10

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A Formula For U.S. Election Outcomes

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A Formula For U.S. Election Outcomes

I am wondering what the chances are for significant U.S. government action on the following ten issues, before 2022:

1. Equity of taxation
(popular/leveling vs. corporate/plutocratic),
2. Extract money from politics, kill Citizens United
(prosecute influence peddling and financial crimes),
3. climate change action (Green New Deal),
4. cut war spending, end the Yemen War
(and cut military-corporate subsidies),
5. Medicare-for-All
(versus insurance company gouging),
6. Social Security expansion
(versus general impoverishment for fat cat gains),
7. fund and staff welfare programs
(food, shelter, childcare, post-disaster assistance),
8. immigration reform and smart liberalization,
9. public school upgrades and teacher funding
(versus vouchers for resegregation; free college),
10. end subsidies for Christian xenophobia bigotry
(pursue Civil rights prosecutions, and Reparations).

This depends on what kinds of administrations we get as a result of national and state elections in 2020 and 2022. So, I devised a mathematical model of U.S. voting outcomes based on voter political affiliations and voting preferences. My aim is to have a tool to quantify my guesses about future election outcomes, so as to improve my speculations on when and to what degree desirable action will be taken on the ten issues stated. This exercise was better than being glum, dejected and confused about American politics, and this essay summarizes my findings. I based my model on voting behavior during U.S. presidential (quadrennial) elections instead of on midterm elections, but why not use it for both?

There were 7 of steps in devising this model: 1, determining the fractional composition of the American electorate by age brackets (15 of them); 2, finding the percent voter turnout by age bracket; 3, finding the party identification (both formal affiliation and casual identification) proportionally by age bracket; 4, collapsing all that data into the percent of the voting population that favors each of the three major U.S. political ideologies (from least to most amorphous): Republican, Democratic, and Independent; 5, examining the tabulated numerical date to divine the most general and instructive relationship, dependent on the fewest number of parameters, to devise a specific correlating and predictive mathematical formula; 6, calculate hypothetical results from this formula and then compare them (to the extent possible) with data on prior election outcomes; and 7, generalize the initial formula into an easily used estimating tool.

The Data

My source for population data was the U.S. Census Bureau [1]. On July 1, 2017, the US population was (officially) 325,719,178, and the voting age (18-85+) population (without considering legal barriers) was 252,018,630. I used data published by Charles Franklin on voter turnout as a function of age (https://medium.com/@PollsAndVotes/age-and-voter-turnout-52962b0884ef), [2]. I collapsed Franklin’s smooth data curve (for voter turnout, by age, to presidential elections) into 15 single values of percent turnout, one for each of the 15 age brackets: 18-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-80, 80-84, 85 and up. Turnout for teen and early 20s voters is 47%-55% (17%-25% for midterms), and turnout increases steadily with age, reaching a broad peak between 80% and 85% for voters 55 to 80 years old (70% to 73% for ages 62 to 79, for midterms). The population between 18 and 34 years (16 year span) is 75,913,971; the population between 60 and 79 years (19 year span) is 58,412,409. The population between 55 and 79 (24 year span) is 80,420,365; the population between 18 and 39 (21 year span) is 97,145,968. Voters between the ages of 18 and 29 (11 year span) contribute 17% of the presidential vote; voters between the ages of 50 and 59 (9 year span) contribute 19% of the presidential vote. Ah, poor youth, condemned to struggle and strive in a country (and world) shaped and directed by the crabbed and brittle prejudices of a smaller number of futureless self-satisfied property owners.

Party affiliation is of two types: being a reliable voter to a party you are registered with, or being an independent voter who will admit to “leaning” (in the voting booth) to the Democrats or Republicans, especially when you are alarmed or enthused about a particular election or issue. Those voters who refuse to declare a duopolistic party allegiance or even a “lean” are the staunch Independents. The Gallup organization has published data on the percent of voters who are Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, as well as leaners to the Democrats and Republicans, by age (https://news.gallup.com/poll/172439/party-identification-varies-widely-across-age-spectrum.aspx), [3]. Using this data, I lumped leaners in with declared party loyalists (respectively, for Republicans and Democrats), and then for each of the 15 age brackets assigned three numerical factors for the percentage of the age bracket voting in each of three modes: Republican, Democratic or Independent. From all the data described to this point, I was able to calculate, for each age bracket, the percent of the presidential vote that went to the Republican and Democratic parties, and to the Independent category. I summed up the results for the 15 age brackets to get an overall composition of the entire voting population, and rounded the final numbers slightly for convenience, to arrive at: 45% Democratic, 40.5% Republican, and 14.5% Independent. I will call this the “baseline.”

Note that all the data described above refers to conditions between 2014 and 2017.

The Formula (!)

If people voted consistently with their declared affiliations, we would have a continuous sequence of Democratic Party administrations; but people don’t, so we have flux and upheaval. In fact, the outcome of our national elections is driven by the surreptitious faithlessness of our tight-lipped (to pollsters at least) Independent voters. Our staunch Independent voters number between 1-in-8 (12.5%) to 1-in-5 (20%) of the voting population, and this fraction varies geographically and over time, in mysterious ways. What actually happens with Independents in the privacy of their voting booths is that they make individual choices about individual issues and candidates, and for each of these they vote in one of three ways: Democratic, Republican, or for one of the myriad of Independent options available, including abstention. So, the 14.5% (to take a fixed number for now) of the voting population that is incorrigibly Independent actually splits into three fractions during voting (quantified here as percentages of the Independent voting population only): I%D, I%R, and I%I. The label I%D represents the percentage of the Independents who voted Democratic in a particular election. Similarly, I%R corresponds to the percentage of the Independents who supplied Republican votes, and I%I corresponds to the percentage of the Independents who remained purely Independent. Note that I%D + I%R + I%I = 100%.

The 4.5% advantage Democrats have over Republicans nationally, based on my calculations (the baseline), can easily be overcome by a 5% or greater net contribution of Republican votes from the Independents. For example, if the Independent population splits: 50% Republican, 5.2% Democratic, and 44.8% staunch Independent (50% + 5.2% + 44.8% = 100% of the Independent population) then they contribute, nationally: 7.2% for Republicans (50% of the 0.145 fraction of the national vote made up of Independents), 0.8% for Democrats (5.2% of their 0.145 national fraction), and 6.5% (44.8% of their 0.145 national fraction) for Independent candidates. The result for the national election becomes: 47.7% Republican (40.5% + 7.2%), 45.8% Democratic (45% + 0.8%), and 6.5% Independent (14.5% – 7.2% – 0.8%). Note that 47.7% + 45.8% + 6.5% = 100% of the national vote. In this case the Republicans win the election with a 2.0% lead (with slight rounding).

By calculating several examples, as just shown, one can arrive at the following equation for election outcomes (for the duopoly horse race).

D-R = 4.5% + [0.145 x (I%D – I%R)].

In words: the percentage difference between Democrats and Republicans in national elections is equal to 4.5% plus the fraction 0.145 multiplied by the difference between the percentage of the Independent voting population that voted Democratic, and the percentage of the Independent voting population that voted Republican. The calculation for the previous example is as follows:

D-R = 4.5% + [0.145 x (5.2% – 50%)] =
D-R = 4.5% + [0.145 x (-44.8%)] =
D-R = 4.5% + [-6.5%]
D-R = -2%

Democrats lose, numerically, by 2%. Also, the actual vote going to Independents nationally is:

Actual Independent Vote Nationally =
14.5% (Independents) – 7.2% (to R) – 0.8% (to D) = 6.5%.

After playing a while with the duopoly horse race estimator formula, give above, I realized one can generalize it further.

D-R = D0 + [Fl x (I%D – I%R)].

D-R = percentage difference between Democrats and Republicans, from election.
D0 = percentage advantage (+) or disadvantage (-) for Democrats, based on affiliations.
FI = the fraction (not percentage) of the voting population that is Independent.
I%D = the percentage of the Independent population that chooses D (this time).
I%R = the percentage of the Independent population that chooses R (this time).
I%I = the percentage of the Independent population that remains I (this time).
Note that: I%D + I%R + I%I = 100%.

So far here, I have used D0 = 4.5%, and FI = 0.145. However, you can choose different numbers based on your own survey of population, voter turnout and party affiliation data, or on your intuition about a particular electoral contest. As mentioned earlier, estimates of FI can range between 0.125 (1/8) to 0.2 (1/5), and perhaps beyond.

Comparing To Previous Elections

I have not found data on the population sizes and voting splits of the Independent voting contingent in previous elections. It would be nice to validate the formula using such data. While the assumptions underpinning this model may not be representative of conditions in all prior US elections, we can nevertheless use prior election results to calculate inferences about what might have been the voting behavior of Independent voters in the past. To do that, we assume that the baseline (40.5% R, 14.5% I, 45% D), which was calculated from 2014-2017 data, has been constant (or nearly constant) since 1968. Here are the calculated inferences on how Independents voted in elections since 1968, based on the known national outcomes.

1968, Nixon
R. Nixon (R) 43.4% vs. H. Humphrey (D) 42.7% vs. G. Wallace (I) 13.5%
Remainder of the national vote is 0.4%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 77.2% (Wallace), 20% (R), 0% (D), 2.8% (I).

1972, Nixon
R. Nixon (R) 60.7% vs. G. McGovern (D) 37.5%
Remainder of the national vote is 1.8%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 87.6% (R), 0% (D), 12.4% (I)

1976, Carter
J. Carter (D) 50.1% vs. G. Ford (R) 48%
Remainder of the national vote is 1.9%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 51.7% (R), 35.2% (D), 13.1% (I)

1980, Reagan
R. Reagan (R) 50.7% vs. J. Carter (D) 41% vs. J. Anderson (I) 6.6%
Remainder of the national vote is 1.7%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 42.8% (R), 0% (D), 45.5% (Anderson), 11.7% (I)

1984, Reagan
R. Reagan (R) 58.8% vs. W. Mondale (D) 40.6%
Remainder of the national vote is 0.6%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 95.9% (R), 0% (D), 4.1% (I)

1988, Bush Sr.
G.H.W. Bush (R) 53.4% vs. M. Dukakis (D) 45.6%
Remainder of the national vote is 1.0%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 89% (R), 4.1% (D), 6.9% (I)

1992, Clinton
W. Clinton (D) 43% vs. G.H.W. Bush (R) 37.4% vs. R. Perot (I) 18.9%
Remainder of the national vote is 0.7%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 0% (R), 0% (D), 95.2% (Perot), 4.8% (I)

1996, Clinton
W. Clinton (D) 49.2% vs. R. Dole (R) 40.7% vs. R. Perot (I) 8.4%
Remainder of the national vote is 1.7%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 1.4% (R), 29% (D), 58% (Perot), 11.6% (I)

2000, Bush Jr.
G. Bush (R) 47.9% vs. A. Gore (D) 48.4%
Remainder of the national vote is 3.7%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 51% (R), 23.5% (D), 25.5% (I)
Bush appointed despite a 0.5% deficit.

2004, Bush Jr.
G. Bush (R) 50.7% vs. J. Kerry (D) 48.3%
Remainder of the national vote is 1.0%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 70.3% (R), 22.8% (D), 6.9% (I)

2008, Obama
B. Obama (D) 52.9% vs. J. McCain (R) 45.7%
Remainder of the national vote is 1.4%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 35.9% (R), 54.4% (D), 9.7% (I)

2012, Obama
B. Obama (D) 51.1% vs. M. Romney (R) 47.2%
Remainder of the national vote is 1.7%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 46.2% (R), 42.1% (D), 11.7% (I)

2016, Trump
D. Trump (R) 46.1% vs. H. Clinton (D) 48.2%
Remainder of the national vote is 5.7%
Independents contribute 14.5% of the national vote
Independents split: 38.6% (R), 22.1% (D), 39.3% (I)
Trump appointed despite a 2.1% deficit.

The 2.1% Republican Credit

In the 2000 election, G. Bush (R) had a 0.5% deficit and was still appointed the 43rd President of the United States of America.

In the 2016 election, H. Clinton (D) gained a 2.1% lead over D. Trump (R) – the same lead J. Carter (D) used to win in 1976 – and yet Trump was appointed the 45th President of the United States of America.

These “deficit wins” were due to a combination of nefarious factors: the Electoral College, pro-Republican judicial bias, voter suppression efforts (in both R and D varieties), vote counting sabotage, and undoubtedly other forms of creative incompetence.

So, today we must assume that because of embedded structural irregularities in the American electoral mechanism, that Democrats must gain more than a 2.1% advantage over Republicans in order to win national elections.

I easily concede that my simple clean mathematical formula does not contain the full range of rascally dirty realities in American electoral spectacles.

Dreams Of DSA Utopia

Could a significant politically leftward sentiment ever take hold among the Independent voting population, and this cause a leftward shift in electoral outcomes? The more socialist (or democratic-socialist, or progressive, of left) the legislators, executives and administrations that result from near-future elections, the more likely the ten issues I listed at the beginning would get serious attention – and action!

W. Clinton (D) won in 1996 with an 8.5% advantage. His Democratic administration was pure corporate, no different from center-right Republican policy before Reagan. I assume that if the voting population turned further away from Republicans, and more in favor of the most socialist-oriented Democratic candidates, that the resulting Democratic administrations would be less corporate-oriented (yes, I know this is magical thinking at present).

So, perhaps a Democratic victory with a 12.5% advantage would result in a Democratic administration that is a half-and-half mixture of corporate (DNC type) Democrats and socialist (DSA type) Democrats, and then some serious nibbling would occur on the ten issues. Mathematically, this could result if the hypothetical Independents split: 55.2% (D), 0% (R), and 44.8% stayed pure (I). The projected national election result would be 53% Democratic, 40.5% Republican, and 6.5% Independent.

An even better though less likely occurrence would be a socialist Democratic Party that gains a 16.5% electoral advantage, driving the Republican Party to extinction (instead of us!). Using the formula, we can infer an Independent split of: 82.8% (D), 0% (R), 17.2% pure (I). The projected national election result would be 57% Democratic, 40.5% Republican, 2.5% Independent.

The ultimate fantasy is of all Independents becoming enthusiastic DSA socialists, so they would add their 14.5% of the national vote to a socialist Democratic Party, with a projected electoral result of: 59.5% Democratic (pure DSA), 40.5% Republican, 0% Independent. An electorate that could accomplish this would empower national and state administrations that would address the ten issues listed earlier, with vigor and all the resources – human, material, and intangible – available to this rich nation.

However improbable the last scenario – of a Socialist political tsunami – appears in the United States of today, I think it is better to keep it in mind as a vision (more easily done if you are young), rather than acidly disparaging and brusquely dismissing it (more likely done by the old and bitter), because it can help motivate useful activism and kind action from those who want a better world with fairer politics and economics, and know that it is humanly possible to get it.

Notes

[1] Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Selected Age Groups by Sex for the United States, States, Counties, and Puerto Rico Commonwealth and Municipios: April 1, [use above title to search in “2017 Population Estimates,” link below is just a start]
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF

[2] Age and Voter Turnout (Charles Franklin)
https://medium.com/@PollsAndVotes/age-and-voter-turnout-52962b0884ef

[3] Party Identification Varies Widely Across the Age Spectrum
https://news.gallup.com/poll/172439/party-identification-varies-widely-across-age-spectrum.aspx

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The Changing American Population, 1610-2010

The population of English colonists on the eastern shores of what would eventually become the United States of America numbered 350 in 1610. Their descendants, along with those of the subsequent imported Black slaves, many immigrants (legal and illegal), and later remnants of the Native American population whose ancestors had populated this continent since as early as 14,000 years ago, reached a cumulative population of 308,745,538 individuals in 2010, within the political boundaries of the U.S.A.

This essay is a very general and simplified overview of how the population within the territory of the United States has grown over the 400 years between 1610 and 2010. While there is a very wide spectrum of “races” and ethnicities in the U.S.A., this essay will focus on only three groups: White people, Black people and Latino (a.k.a. Hispanic) people. Both White and Black people are thought of as two racial groups; while Hispanic people have Spanish as their original language, and their cultures are based on it, and they can be of any race: White, Black, Red, Yellow, and any mix of these. The summation of the White, Black and Hispanic populations in the U.S. makes up nearly the total US population. Asian and Pacific Islander people make up only 4.9% of the US population (in 2010); and American Indian, Eskimo and Aleut people make up only 0.9% of the US population (in 2010).

An aside on “races”: Based on genetics there is only one race of humans, but the concept of human races — popularly treated as species! — based on skin color, facial and physiological features, is still too widespread and embedded in popular culture to be dispensed with here. Also, race is tabulated in U.S. Census data, upon which this essay is based.

What I am interested to learn is if I can understand the politics of a period from the demographics of that time.

I have made a few simple charts of the racial and ethnic population fractions in the United States for Whites, Blacks and Latinos, based on historical census data spanning the years 1610 to 2010 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_racial_and_ethnic_demographics_of_the_United_States).

The first pair of charts (quantitatively identical, just with different data-set color schemes, for ease of viewing) show fractional populations as percents of the total US population, from 1610 to 2010. The top curve is for White people, the longer lower curve is for Black people, and the shorter lower curve, which begins at 1850, is for Latino (Hispanic) people.

This census data is not perfect. The United States Census has enumerated Whites and Blacks since 1790. Asians and Native Americans have been enumerated since 1860, though all Native Americans were not enumerated until 1890. A category enumerated since 1950 is “some other race,” and a category enumerated since 2000 is “two or more races.” Hispanics have been enumerated since 1940, with the exceptions of 1950 and 1960, but some estimates for the Hispanic population were made for certain years before 1940 as well as for 1950 and 1960.

The recorded percentages over time of the US population made up of Asian and Pacific Islander people are: 0 for 1610-1850; under 1% for 1860-1970; 1.5% for 1980; 2.9% for 1990; 3.8% for 2000; 4.9% for 2010.

The number of Native Americans in 1492 within the territory of the present day United States probably numbered 5 million people. By 1900 this population had dwindled to 237,196 (its minimum). It grew subsequently, reaching 1,420,400 in 1980, and 2,932,248 in 2010.

The growth of the total US population — as recorded by the imperfect census data — is shown in this next pair of charts.

The first chart of this second pair of graphics is best for visualizing the grow of population above 5 million people, after 1800. The recorded population grew from 350 in 1610 to about 5 million in 1800. The second chart of this pair of graphics is a logarithmic (linear-log) representation of the data, and makes it possible to see the quantitative trend, especially prior to 1800.

Returning to the fractional population charts, notice the following features:

1610-1770

The fractional population of Whites dropped from 100% in 1610, to under 80% in 1770; with a corresponding rise in the fractional population of Blacks from 0% (a relatively small number in actuality) in 1610, to over 20% in 1770. In the Colonial America of 1770, 1 out of very 5 people was Black (remember, Native Americans were not counted). This (20%) is the maximum that the fractional population of Blacks ever achieved in American history (but of course, the absolute Black population has grown throughout US history). This growth in Black population was a result of the importation of enslaved Blacks from Africa. The total Colonial American population during this period grew from 350 to 2,148,076.

1770-1850

The fractional population of Whites rose from its local minimum of less than 80% in 1770, to almost 85% in 1850. The fractional Black population dropped from its local maximum of over 20% in 1770, to about 16% in 1850. A law banning the importation of slaves into the United States took effect in 1808, but slavery itself was not outlawed. Blacks were born into slavery if their parents were enslaved, and the absolute population of Blacks in the U.S. grew. This period of 1770 to 1850 corresponds to the Industrial Revolution, which was the transition to new manufacturing processes in the period from about 1760 to sometime between 1820 and 1840. This transition included going from hand production methods to machines, new chemical manufacturing and iron production processes, the increasing use of steam power, the development of machine tools and the rise of the factory system. Immigrants from Europe added to the White population in the U.S., for example Irish people seeking escape from their Great Famine of 1845 to 1852. The total American population during this period grew from 2,148,076 to 23,191,876.

1850-1900

The recorded (estimated) percentage of the US population made up of Hispanic people was under 0.8% between 1850 and 1900. In 1845, the United States annexed the “Republic of Texas” (Mexican territory occupied by “illegal immigrant” American slave owners seeking to expand the slave plantation system of the Southern U.S., westward). Mexico’s defeat in the subsequent Mexican-American War of 1846-1848, resulted in the loss of one-third of its territory to the U.S. That new US territory is the present day American states of Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona, Utah, Nevada and California.

The fractional population of Whites rose from nearly 85% in 1850, to about 87% in 1900; while the fractional population of Blacks dropped from about 16% in 1850, to about 13% in 1900. This half-century period encompassed the Civil War, the Indian Wars in the American West, and the Spanish-American War, when the United States became an overseas empire. The total American population during this period grew from 23,191,876 to 75,994,575.

1900-1930

Between 1900 and 1930, the fractional White population rose from 87% to 90%, while the fractional Black population dropped from 13% to under 10%. This thirty year span included the latter Gilded Age, World War I, the Roaring Twenties, and the Crash of 1929, which was the beginning of the Great Depression. The total American population during this period grew from 75,994,575 to 122,775,046.

1930-1940

The years 1930 to 1940 spanned most of the Great Depression (which actually occurred from 1929 to 1942), and are a local maximum of fractional White population (~90%), and a local minimum of fractional Black population (~9%). The fractional Hispanic population during 1930 to 1940 rose from about 1.3% to 1.5%. The total American population during this period grew from 122,775,046 to 131,669,275.

1930-1950

Between 1930 and 1950, the fractional White population remained at close to 90%, while the fractional Black population remained at close to 10%. This twenty year period included the Great Depression, World War II, and the brief Cold War period just after World War II and just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The fractional population of Hispanics rose from about 1.3% to 2.1% during 1930 to 1950. The total American population during this period grew from 122,775,046 to 150,697,361.

1950-1970

Between 1950 and 1970, the fractional White population dropped from its highest proportion since 1700 (about 90%) to nearly 88%. The fractional Black population rose from 10% to 11%; and the fractional Hispanic population grew at an accelerating pace — more than doubling — from 2.1% to over 4.4%. The rapid increase in US Latino population was a result of their higher fertility, and increased immigration from Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean.

The people on the island of Puerto Rico, captured during the Spanish-American War of 1898, were given US citizenship in 1917, but not the right to vote in US national elections, nor were Puerto Rico’s elected representatives allowed to vote in the U.S. Congress (to this day). But, that extension of US citizenship for Puerto Rico came just in the nick of time for the Wilson Administration to draft men from Puerto Rico to fight (and presumably some die) in World War I, and similarly in the subsequent wars of the United States. Puerto Ricans who want to vote in US elections have to migrate to the US mainland and settle there, which many did during the 1940s and 1950s, primarily to seek better economic opportunities. The musical “West Side Story” is an artistic artifact inspired by this wave of immigration from Puerto Rico to the US mainland.

The twenty year span of 1950 to 1970 included: most of the postwar boom (occurring primarily from 1948 to 1971), which encompassed the last two years of the Truman Administration, and the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, and the first two years of the Nixon Administration, as well as the Vietnam War up through the time of the American invasion of Cambodia, ordered by the Nixon-Kissinger Administration. The total American population grew from 150,697,361 in 1950, to 203,210,158 in 1970.

1970-2010

The total American population grew from 203,210,158 in 1970, to 308,745,538 in 2010.

During the 40 years between 1970 and 2010, the fractional White population dropped significantly from 88% to 72%. The fractional Black population rose modestly from 11% to 12.6%; and the fractional Hispanic population zoomed from 4.4% to 16.3%. In the year 2000, the fractional Black and fractional Hispanic populations were essentially equal (12.3% and 12.5%, respectively), and subsequently the fractional Hispanic population became larger, and continued growing faster.

The rapid rise of the fractional Hispanic population subsequent to 1950, and especially since 1970, is responsible for the accelerating drop in the fractional White population (since the fractional Black population has changed little, and other fractional populations, as for Asians, are still relatively small).

The increase of the Hispanic population beyond that of the Black population after 2000, along with the corresponding drop in the fractional White population, has fueled the racial tensions expressed today as the Trump Administration: widespread Black resentment of Latinos (“Mexicans”), and the overt exercise of political power by White Supremacy: anti-immigrant and deportation policies against “illegal” Mexicans and people from Muslim-dominant countries, as well as voter suppression efforts aimed at Blacks and poorer Hispanics (many ethnically Mexican and Central American).

Trumpism is the combination of fear of demographic dilution — held by previously dominant racial-ethnic sub-populations; and of insatiably desperate exclusionary avarice seeking climax before our Pompeii-like climapocalyptic termination — held by the traditional, dominant and uppermost classes of American wealth.

Most of the undocumented (“illegal”) Central American immigrants to the United States were and are actually refugees from countries whose economies have been withered by US corporate vampirism backed by both direct and indirect US military interventions propping up corrupt and viciously cruel oligarchic client regimes. This predatory US imperialism “south of the border” stretches back to the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848, and includes many US Marine invasions and occupations prior to World War II, as famously condemned by General Smedley Butler (who was awarded several Medals of Honor for his heroism during such actions, in his earlier years when he commanded troops in them).

During World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt instituted the “Good Neighbor Policy,” which amounted to the U.S. being nice to Latin America and buying its export products at good prices for the producers (for example buying the entire Cuban sugar output during the war years), so as to induce the countries of the Caribbean and Central and South America to remain neutral in that war, instead of cashing in by provisioning Germany, and allowing its submarines to harbor safely in Latin American ports, and thus be able to hunt for Allied (i.e., American) war supply ships close to US shores.

After World War II, the Good Neighbor Policy disappeared and it was back to the Monroe Doctrine modus operandi. And, Central American peasants fleeing economic starvation and political murder would go north (to this day). A particularly bad period in this regard was during the Nicaraguan Revolution (1962-1990), and during the Reagan Administration (1981-1988), which massively, overtly and surreptitiously prosecuted its proxy Contra War in Nicaragua, in support of the remnant army and police forces of the Somoza dictatorship, which had been deposed by Nicaraguan socialists during 1978-1979.

The Reagan Administration also carried on similar proxy wars in Guatemala and El Salvador. The neofascist forces the Reagan Administration backed and supplied were responsible for many excessively cruel and massively bloody deeds, which many people — including me — considered genocidal. After 1990, the Central American wars tapered off, but the fundamental struggle — of a peasantry seeking political freedom, economic control of their lives, social justice, and physical security from arbitrary exploitation, torture and murder by the death squads and militarized police forces employed by corrupt oligarchic client regimes — still continues in some Central American countries.

And so, streams of impoverished displaced living victims of American profiteering in Central America go north, hoping to find their personal salvations in the United States. Those that make it (legally or illegally) add to the Latino Population Tsunami that is altering the demographic layering of the US population.

How will our changing demographics change our future politics? Good question.

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Collage image “Xenophobia,” by Thomas Calderon, sent on 30 September 2018

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ADDENDUM, 2 October 2018

TRUMPISM is the combination of fear of demographic dilution — held by previously dominant racial-ethnic sub-populations; and of insatiably desperate exclusionary avarice seeking climax before our Pompeii-like climapocalyptic termination — held by the traditional, dominant and uppermost classes of American wealth. Between 1970-2010 (census years) White population dropped 15.3% (from 87.7% to 72.4%, of which 8.7% was Hispanic), Black population rose 1.5% (from 11.1% to 12.6%) and Hispanic population nearly QUADRUPLED (from 4.4% to 16.3%).

The trends shown above are what fuel U.S. white supremacy, both in sentiment and in political action. The growth of the US Hispanic population is driven overwhelmingly by a higher fertility rate, not immigration. White people, worldwide, are the richest “racial” population, and they have the lowest fertility rate (more money, less kids). “Darker” and poorer populations have higher fertility rates. Trumpism (which includes anti-abortionism for white people too), the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and the former apartheid by and for white South Africa were/are wars against demographic dilution, perpetrated by the wealthy white low ‘fertiles’ (WWLFs) against poor dark high ‘fertiles’, (PDHFs). These “heart of whiteness” wars against demographic dilution are also wars for exclusionary capital hoarding (“race capitalism”). Also, these wars are the echoes of the white slave owner fears of the 17th through 19th centuries (over slave revolts), and the European imperialism of the 18th through 20th centuries (colonial wars). There is a lot of resistance among the world’s people to tolerate each other, and share the Earth (for doing so would tumble capitalism, authoritarianism, patriarchy and religion).

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